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Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists,
due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the
theoretical counterpart of several economics, social, and computational applications on the Internet. In their
several variants, these games model the tension of a player between her two antagonistic goals: to be as
close as possible to the other players, and to activate a cheapest possible set of links. However, the generally
adopted assumption is that players have a common and complete information about the ongoing network,
which is quite unrealistic in practice. In this paper, we consider a more compelling scenario in which players
have only limited information about the network they are embedded in. More precisely, we explore the
game-theoretic and computational implications of assuming that players have a complete knowledge of the
network structure only up to a given radius k, which is one of the most qualified local-knowledge models
used in distributed computing. To this respect, we define a suitable equilibrium concept, and we provide a
comprehensive set of upper and lower bounds to the price of anarchy for the entire range of values of k, and
for the two classic variants of the game, namely those in which a player’s cost — besides the activation cost
of the owned links — depends on the maximum/sum of all the distances to the other nodes in the network,
respectively. These bounds are finally assessed through an extensive set of experiments.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: G.2.2 [Discrete Mathematics]: Graph Theory—network problems
General Terms: Algorithms, Theory, Economics
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Game Theory, Network Creation Games, Price of Anarchy, Local Knowl-
edge
1. INTRODUCTION
In a network creation game (NCG), we are given n players (identified as the nodes of a
graph), which attempt to settle an undirected interconnection network. This is realized
by letting each player connect herself directly to a subset of players, through the acti-
vation of the corresponding set of incident links. These links can then be freely used
by everyone, and so a player remains connected to non-adjacent players indirectly, i.e.,
by following a shortest path in the currently active network. In such a decentralized
process, a player has then to strategically balance the sum of two costs: the building
cost, which is given by the sum of the costs she incurs in activating her links, and the
routing cost, which is a function of the length of the shortest paths towards the other
players.
Due to their generality, it is evident that NCGs can model very different practical sit-
uations. Just to mention an example, NCGs are fit to model the decentralized construc-
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tion of communication networks, in which the constituting components (e.g., routers
and links) are activated and maintained by different owners, as in the Internet. In the
very first formulation of the game [Jackson and Wolinsky 1996], the building and rout-
ing costs are defined as follows. Concerning the building cost, each activated link (i, j)
has a cost cij (respectively, cji) for player i (respectively, j), and the formation of a link
requires the consent of both players involved (since each of the parties pays the corre-
sponding activating cost), while link severance can be done unilaterally. On the other
hand, the routing cost is given by a function additively depending on the distances
to all the other players. Later on, Fabrikant et al. [Fabrikant et al. 2003] developed a
simplified version of this model, which is also the most popular one in the field of Al-
gorithmic Game Theory (AGT), namely that in which the activation of each link has
a fixed cost α > 0, and this is incurred by the activating player only and without the
consent of the adjacent player, while the routing cost is simply the sum of the distances
to all the other players (in graph terminology, this is known as the status of a node).
Besides this simplification, the merit of such a paper was that of emphasizing how the
social utility for a (very large) system as a whole is affected by the selfish behavior of
the players, which was instead downplayed by the economists, that were more focused
on system stability issues. This new perspective inspired then a sequel of papers in the
AGT community, as detailed in the following.
Previous work on NCGs. More formally, the form of a NCG as provided in
[Fabrikant et al. 2003], which we call SUMNCG, is as follows: we are given a set of
n players, say V , where the strategy space of player u ∈ V is the power set 2V \{u}.
Given a combination of strategies σ = (σu)u∈V , let G(σ) denote the underlying undi-
rected graph whose node set is V , and whose edge set is E(σ) = {(u, v) : u ∈ V ∧v ∈ σu}.
Then, the cost incurred by player u in σ is
Cu(σ) = α · |σu|+
∑
v∈V
dG(σ)(u, v) (1)
where dG(σ)(u, v) is the distance between u and v in G(σ). When a player takes an
action (i.e., activates a subset of incident edges), she aims to keep this cost as low
as possible. Under the assumption of a complete knowledge of G(σ), we therefore
have that a player u is fully aware that after switching from strategy σu to strat-
egy σ′u, the network will change to G(σ−u, σ
′
u). Thus, a Nash Equilibrium
1 (NE)
for the game is a strategy profile σ¯ such that for every player u and every strat-
egy profile σu, we have that Cu(σ¯) ≤ Cu(σ¯−u, σu). If we characterize the space of
NE in terms of the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the social cost
of the costlier NE to the optimal (centralized) social cost, then it has been shown
this is constant for all values of α except for n1−ε ≤ α < 65n, for any ε ≥ 1/ logn
(see [Mamageishvili et al. 2013; Mihala´k and Schlegel 2013]), while an upper bound
of 2O(
√
logn) is known for the remaining values of α [Demaine et al. 2012]. Moreover,
very recently, in [Graham et al. 2013] it was proven that for all constant non-integral
α ≥ 2, the PoA is bounded by 1 + o(1).
A first natural variant of SUMNCG was introduced in [Demaine et al. 2012], where
the eccentricity of a player rather than her status was considered as a measure of
centrality in the network, and then the player cost function was redefined as follows:
Cu(σ) = α · |σu|+max{dG(σ)(u, v) : v ∈ V }. (2)
This variant, named MAXNCG, received further attention in
[Mihala´k and Schlegel 2013], where the authors improved the PoA of the game
1In this paper, we only focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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on the whole range of values of α, obtaining in this case that the PoA is constant for
all values of α except for 129 > α = ω(1/
√
n), while for the remaining values of α, it is
at most 2O(
√
log n).
Besides these two basic models, many variations on the theme have been defined.
We mention those obtained by limiting the modification a player can do on her cur-
rent strategy (see [Alon et al. 2013; Lenzner 2012; Mihala´k and Schlegel 2012]), or by
budgeting either the number of edges a player can activate or her eccentricity (see
[Laoutaris et al. 2014; Ehsani et al. 2011; Bilo` et al. 2012a]), or finally by constraining
the set of available links to a host graph (see [Bilo` et al. 2012b; Demaine et al. 2009]).
Generally speaking, in all the above models the obtained upper bounds on the PoA are
asymptotically worse than those we get in the two basic models.
Criticisms to the standard model. Observe that while the general assumption that
players have a common and complete information about the ongoing network is feasible
for small-size instances of the game, this becomes unrealistic for large-size networks.
This is rather problematic, since the asymptotic analysis which guides the AGT liter-
ature requires instead a growing size of the input. Moreover, quite paradoxically, the
full-knowledge assumption is not simplifying at all: it makes computationally unfea-
sible for a player to select a best-response strategy, or even to check whether she is
actually in a NE!
Very recently, the same observation leads Ballester Pla et al. to consider in
[Ballester Pla et al. 2009] a more compelling scenario for the related class of network
(or graphical) games. In a graphical game, players are embedded in a network, and
the cost of a player depends on her action and on those of her neighbors, and thus is
correlated to the (knowledge of the) entire network. In [Ballester Pla et al. 2009] the
authors assume instead that players have a complete knowledge of the network struc-
ture up to a given radius k, and use this information to make up a belief about the
rest of the network. For this model, they provide a closed formula to compute a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium for the game, and show an interesting relationship with a scenario
in which players have a bounded rationality (i.e., they take a step by only exploring a
subset of the strategy space).
Another work which constrains the available strategies of the players according to a
concept of locality is [Hoefer 2013]. In this work the author studies the non-coordinated
process of matching formation where each player can (potentially) match with any
other player having distance at most k in a graph which depends on the current state
of the game.
Our new NCG model. In this paper we concentrate on MAXNCG and SUMNCG,
in this order of presentation and importance, but we deviate from the standard full-
knowledge model, and we explore the theoretical implications on the two games in-
duced by the assumption that players have a partial view of the network. More pre-
cisely, we consider the players to have only knowledge of their k-neighborhood (as in
[Ballester Pla et al. 2009]), i.e., each player knows k and the entire network up to the
nodes at distance at most k from herself. Furthermore, we also assume that players
do not even know the size n of the network (in distributed computing terminology, the
system is uniform).2
Despite of this partial knowledge of the network structure, the players keep on using
the entire network, and so their cost function is still given by Eqs. (2) and (1), respec-
tively. However, such a cost must now be revised as implicitly incurred by the players
— as a consequence of using the network — rather than being explicitly known. On
2According to the spirit of the game, we assume that in our model the players initially sit on a connected
network.
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the other hand, consistently with the model, the strategy space of a player is now
restricted to selecting a subset of nodes in her k-neighborhood. So, it is in the best
interest of a player to reduce an unknown global cost, but with the limitation of only
knowing and modifying a local portion of the network. This ambitious task must be
modeled through a coherent definition of the players’ rational behavior, as we explain
in the following. Actually, a player has a partial (defective) view of the network, and
thus before taking a step, she has to evaluate whether such a choice is convenient in
every realizable network which is compatible with her current view. More formally, let
σu be the strategy played by player u, and define Σ|σu to be the set of strategy pro-
files σ = (σ−u, σu) of the players such that the network G(σ) is realizable according to
player u’s view. Let
∆(σu, σ
′
u) = max
σ∈Σ|σu
{Cu(σ−u, σ′u)− Cu(σ)} (3)
denote the worst possible cost difference player u would have in switching from σu to
σ′u. For our model, we use a suitable equilibrium concept (weaker than NE), that we
call Local Knowledge Equilibrium (LKE), and which is defined as a strategy profile σ¯
such that for every player u and every strategy profile σu, we have that ∆(σ¯u, σu) ≥ 0.
As the set of realizable networks G(σ) can be infinite, it might appear that a player
is not even able to determine if a strategy is convenient. However, in Section 2 we
will show that, in contrast with the intuition, this is not the case. In particular, for
MAXNCG we will show that the worst-case scenario for a player is the one in which
the network coincides with her view. Therefore, the player only needs to take into ac-
count her view when evaluating a new strategy, ignoring in some sense the portion
of the network she cannot see. This also means that, in our model, a player behaves
exactly as she would do in the full-knowledge game played on the graph induced by
her k-neighborhood. This crucial analogy (which, in contrast, does not hold so tightly
for SUMNCG, as we discuss later) also explains why we put first the local-knowledge
version of MAXNCG in our study: it allows us to fairly compare our game with the tra-
ditional MAXNCG, since we are only concerned on how the bounded view will impact
on (the dynamics of) the game, given that the behavior of the players will remain the
same. Besides that, we point out another remarkable property of our model: differently
from the standard model, we have that the computational hardness of establishing an
improving strategy is now depending not on the size of the entire network, but only on
the size of her k-neighborhood. Therefore, although in principle this latter one could
be Θ(n) already for small values of k, we believe that in practice the situation may be
quite different, as the size of the known network is expected to be constant (or at least
very small) compared to n.
Regarding SUMNCG, it is instead easy to see that if a player increases the distance
of any vertex x at distance exactly k in her view, then her cost might increase. Indeed,
as the rest of the network is unknown to the player, it might be the case that the dis-
tance of a large number of non-viewable nodes will increase as well. Nevertheless, for
every other strategy, we show that the worst-case network coincides with the player’s
view. In conclusion, the above discussion shows that the player can choose and evalu-
ate her strategies as in the classical SUMNCG, but with the exception of the strategies
that increase the distances of the nodes at distance k, which are forbidden. Thus, there
is a dyscrasia between the full- and the local-knowledge version of the game: in this
latter one, a player will actually have a more conservative behavior, since an improv-
ing strategy w.r.t. her partial view (i.e., ignoring what is outside her view) would not
necessarily be an improving strategy w.r.t. the entire network (as it was the case for
MAXNCG)!
Locality-based Network Creation Games A:5
Our results. Having in mind this solution concept and this asymmetric relationship
of the two local-knowledge games w.r.t. to their classical counterpart, we characterize
the corresponding space of equilibria w.r.t. the social optimum through the study of
upper and lower bounds to the PoA. We remark that, as the set of LKEs is broader
than the set of NEs, the PoA in our model can only be worse than the PoA in the
full-knowledge model.
First, we consider MAXNCG, and we give three lower bounds to the PoA which are
based on different constructions each holding in different ranges of k and α. One of
these is based on a dense graph, while the other two will have an high social cost due
to their large diameter. In this latter case, the difficulty of the construction relies on
the fact that, when α is small, we need to guarantee that no player can decrease her
cost by buying new edges. We deal with this issue by carefully exploiting the defective
views of the players, i.e., we provide a non-trivial construction where every player is
not aware that buying a small number of edges would reduce her cost.
We also provide an upper bound to the PoA by considering both the density
and the diameter of an equilibrium graph. In order to prove this bound, we take
inspiration from techniques successfully used, for example, in [Alon et al. 2013;
Demaine et al. 2012], which allow to (lower) bound the number of nodes within a cer-
tain distance from a player. However, these techniques cannot be directly applied to
our model since they require additional work to cope with the concept of locality.
The bounds to the PoA that arise from the various combinations of these results are
discussed in detail in Section 3.3, and they are essentially tight for many ranges of α
and k. Here we just outline some prominent implications of our results. For example,
for constant values of k (regardless of α) we are able to exhibit stable graphs having
diameter Ω(n). This immediately implies that the PoA is Ω( n1+α ), which is fairly bad.
However, one might expect the PoA to decrease for large values of α. This is not the
case, as we can show a tight lower bound of Ω(n
1
Θ(k) ). This is in sharp contrast with
the classical full-knowledge version of the game where the PoA is constant as soon
as α ≥ 129. On the other hand, when k increases, the PoA decreases, although this
happens quite slowly. Indeed, even when k = O(2
√
log n) and α = O(log n) the PoA is
still Ω(n1−ǫ) for every ǫ > 0. On the bright side, as soon as k = Ω(nǫ) for any ǫ > 0, we
have that, in every LKE, each player has a complete knowledge of the network, and so
the PoA coincides with the PoA of the full-knowledge game, hence it is mostly constant.
Then, we consider the sum version of the game, and we show that some of the lower
bound schemes used for MAXNCG can be extended to SUMNCG as well. In particular,
a strong lower bound of Ω
(
n
k
)
to the PoA holds if k ≤ c′ · 3√α and α ≤ n, for a suitable
constant c′. Observe that the latter lower bound is at least Ω(n
2
3 ). Moreover, we show
that for α ≤ n, the set of LKEs coincides with the set of NEs as soon as k ≥ c · √α,
for a suitable constant c. Thus, in this region the PoA is constant, as a consequence of
the corresponding result for the full-knowledge version of the game. Unfortunately, we
cannot exhibit non-trivial upper bounds for the remaining values of the (α, k)-space,
and we leave this as a future goal of our research.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we characterize
the player’s behavior, and we provide some remarks on the complexity of computing
a best-response strategy and on the convergence issues of the iterated version of the
game. In Sections 3 and 4 we focus on the main results of this paper, namely the study
of the PoA for MAXNCG and SUMNCG, respectively. Then, in Section 5 we provide an
extensive set of experiments, which for a twofold reason we restricted to MAXNCG:
on one hand, we have for it a more exhaustive theoretical characterization of the PoA
space to compare with, and on the other hand, as we will explain in more detail in the
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section, for MAXNCG is computationally feasible to find a best-response strategy of a
player for reasonably large values of n and k. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper
and provides few directions of future research.
2. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
We start by showing that, despite the defective knowledge of the network, a player is
able to evaluate whether a strategy is convenient in a worst-case scenario. In particu-
lar, when a player u changes her strategy from σu to σ
′
u, she needs to evaluate∆(σu, σ
′
u)
by figuring out a realizable networkG(σ)maximizing (3). In the following propositions
we will characterize this worst-case network for both MAXNCG and SUMNCG.
Let H be the view of u in G(σ), i.e. the subgraph of G(σ) induced by the k-
neighborhood of u, and let G ∈ G be a generic realizable network w.r.t. H . Let
G′ = G \ ({u} × σu) ∪ ({u} × σ′u) be the network G after the strategy change. In a
similar manner, let H ′ = H \ ({u} × σu) ∪ ({u} × σ′u) be the old view of u modified
according to the strategy change. Notice that H ′ might not coincide with the view of u
in G′.
PROPOSITION 2.1. In MAXNCG, the worst-case network maximizing (3) coincides
with H .
PROOF. Consider a generic network G. In switching from σu to σ
′
u the player u is
paying an additional cost of:
α(|σ′u| − |σu|) + max
v
dG′(u, v)−max
v
dG(u, v). (4)
Let y be the vertex maximizing maxv dG′(u, v). If dG(u, y) < k then y belongs to both
H and thus to H ′ as well, therefore the formula (4) can be upper-bounded by α(|σ′u| −
|σu|)+maxv∈V (H′) dH′ (u, v)−maxv∈V (G) dG(u, v), which is attained when G = H (hence
G′ = H ′) since any graph in G is a supergraph of H . Otherwise, let x be the unique
vertex in a shortest path π from u to y in G such that dG(u, x) = k. Notice that the
subpath of π between x and y also lies in G′, hence dG′(x, y) ≤ dG(x, y). We can rewrite
(4) as follows: α(|σ′u| − |σu|) + dG′(u, y) − maxv dG(u, v) ≤ α(|σ′u| − |σu|) + dG′(u, x) +
dG′(x, y)− dG(u, y) ≤ α(|σ′u| − |σu|)+ dH′(u, x) + dG(x, y)− dG(u, x)− dG(x, y) = α(|σ′u| −
|σu|) + dH′(u, x)− k ≤ α(|σ′u| − |σu|) + maxv∈V (H′) dH′(u, v)−maxv∈V (H) dH(u, v).
Notice that, according to the above discussion, the players do not even need to know
the value of k in order to play the game. Regarding SUMNCG, let us define as F the
set a vertices at distance exactly k from u in H .
PROPOSITION 2.2. In SUMNCG, every strategy that increases the distance of some
vertex of F in H ′ is not an improving strategy for u. For every other strategy of u, the
worst-case network maximizing (3) coincides with H .
PROOF. Consider a generic network G. When u switches from σu to σ
′
u she pays an
additional cost of:
α(|σ′u| − |σu|) +
∑
v
dG′(u, v)−
∑
v
dG(u, v). (5)
We first notice that if there exists a vertex y such that dG(u, y) = dH(u, y) =
k and dH′ (u, y) > k then u is not improving in the worst-case scenario. Indeed
we can make (5) positive by letting G be equal to the graph H where a large
number η of nodes has been appended to y, as (5) becomes at least α(|σ′u| −
|σu|) +
∑
v∈H dG′(u, v) −
∑
v∈H dG(u, v) + η. Therefore, we restrict to strategies σ
′
u
where if dH(u, y) = k then dH′ (u, y) ≤ k. Call P the set of vertices x such that
dG(u, x) < k, the formula (5) becomes: α(|σ′u| − |σu|) +
∑
v∈P
(
dG′(u, v) − dG(u, v)
)
+
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∑
v 6∈P
(
dG′(u, v)−dG(u, v)
) ≤ α(|σ′u|−|σu|)+∑v∈P (dH′(u, v)−dH(u, v))+∑v 6∈P (dG′(u, v)
− dG(u, v)
) ≤ α(|σ′u| − |σu|) +∑v∈P (dH′ (u, v)− dH(u, v)), since for every v 6∈ P we have
dG′(u, v) ≤ dG(u, v). This upper bound to (5) is attained when G = H .
We now provide some remarks on the complexity of computing a best-response strat-
egy and on convergence issues.
We start by noticing that the NP-hardness reductions which are known in the
full-knowledge model for finding a best response in SUMNCG and MAXNCG can
be extended to our games for every k ≥ 2 and k ≥ 1, respectively. Indeed, the
full-knowledge versions of MAXNCG and SUMNCG are NP-hard for α = 2/n (see
[Mihala´k and Schlegel 2013]) and for every 1 < α < 2 (see [Fabrikant et al. 2003]), re-
spectively. Both reductions are from the MINIMUM DOMINATING SET problem, that
is the problem of finding a minimum cardinality subset U of vertices of an undirected
graph G such that every vertex v ∈ V (G) has a neighbor in U or is in U itself. In both
reductions, any best response of a new single player that joins the network G is buy-
ing all the edges towards the vertices of a minimum dominating set of G. Since in the
full-knowledge versions of MAXNCG and SUMNCG, the best response of a player is in-
dependent from the strategy she is actually playing, both games remain NP-hard even
if the new player is initially buying all the edges towards all the other players. Turning
back to our games, this is equivalent to say that the new player always sees the entire
network. Moreover, for k ≥ 2, the new player is aware to have the full-knowledge of the
network as she knows k, and does not see vertices at distance 2 from her. Therefore,
by Proposition 2.1, we have that MAXNCG is NP-hard for every k ≥ 1 and α = 2/n.
Furthermore, by Proposition 2.2, we have that SUMNCG is NP-hard for every k ≥ 2
and every 1 < α < 2.
Concerning the convergence issue, let us consider the iterated version of the game.3
A natural question is whether a better- or best-response dynamics always converges to
an equilibrium state. Unfortunately, a negative answer to this question follows from
the divergence results presented in [Kawald and Lenzner 2013] on the full-knowledge
model for SUMNCG and MAXNCG, since they are based on an instance having (small)
constant diameter. This immediately implies the existence of a cycling best-response
dynamics for both games as soon as k ≥ c for a constant c.
3. RESULTS FOR MAXNCG
For the sake of exposition, but also for all the other reasons we discussed in the in-
troduction, we first analyze MAXNCG, and then we consider SUMNCG. Moreover, for
technical convenience, we will assume α > 1 although our constructions can also be
extended to the case α ≤ 1. We recall that in the full-knowledge version of the game,
for α > 1 the spanning star is the social optimum and has a cost of Θ(αn+ n).
3.1. Lower bounds for MAXNCG
We present three lower bounds to the PoA based on three graphs with high social cost
which are in equilibrium for different ranges of α and k. The first is a cycle. We have
the following.
LEMMA 3.1. If k ≥ 1 and α ≥ k − 1 then PoA = Ω( n1+α ).
PROOF. Consider a cycle on n ≥ 2k + 2 vertices where each player owns exactly one
edge. The view of each player u is a path of length 2k with u as the center vertex. In
order to decrease her eccentricity u has to buy at least one edge. This will decrease the
3We assume that the players other than being myopic are also oblivious, namely at each time they only
argue about the current view, without taking care of previous views.
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usage cost of u by at most k − 1 and increase the building cost of u by at least α. Then,
PoA = Ω
(
αn+n2
αn+n
)
= Ω
(
n
1+α
)
.
The next lower bound is based on a dense graph of large girth.
LEMMA 3.2. For each 2 ≤ k = o(log n) and α ≥ 1 the PoA is Ω(n 12k−2 ).
PROOF. For each even integer g ≥ 6 and prime power q there exists a q-regular
graph of girth at least g with n vertices and Ω(n1+
1
g−4 ) edges [Lazebnik et al. 1995].
We choose g = 2k + 2 and construct such a graph. The view of each player u is a tree
of height k with q(q − 1)i−1 vertices on level i. Moreover, the player u owns at most q
edges.
In order to reduce her usage cost by i, player umust buy at least q(q−1)i−q additional
edges. If we choose q ≥ 3 then the increase in the building cost will exceed the decrease
in the usage cost. Hence, we have that the PoA is at least Ω(αn
1+ 1
g−4
(1+α)n ) = Ω(n
1
2k−2 ).
It can be shown that the previous construction holds for k = o(logn).
The last lower bound is based on a sparse graph with large diameter. The construc-
tion is non-trivial and it is a generalization of the graph shown in [Alon et al. 2013].
Although the precise definition is critical, we now give some intuition on how the graph
is built. Roughly speaking, the original graph resembles a 2-dimensional square grid
that was rotated by 45◦ and had the vertices on the opposite sides identified in order to
form a toroidal shape. This graph has several useful properties: it is vertex-transitive
and the diameter is about the length of a “side” of the grid. Moreover, if the value of k
is small, each player u is not aware of the toroidal shape as she only sees a “square”
subgraph. This subgraph has 4 vertices at distance k from u whose pairwise distance
are 2k. This fact can be used to show that, actually, this graph is stable for small val-
ues of α and k, e.g. α = k = 1. Unfortunately, this is no longer true for larger values
of k since, for example, the addition of 4 edges suffices to reduce the eccentricity of
Ω(k). Moreover, if α is large, a player has convenience in removing an edge as this re-
sults in a constant increase in her eccentricity. To deal with these issues we generalize
this construction in three ways. First, we increase the number of dimensions from 2
to a parameter d so that the graph now resembles a rotated d-dimensional cube grid
where each face has been identified with the opposite one. For each vertex u we are
now able to find 2d other vertices that are at a distance of k from u and whose pairwise
distances are at least 2k. Second, in order to get a graph with large diameter, we no
longer restrict the dimensions to be equal to each other. Intuitively, instead of starting
with a d-dimensional “cube”, we start with a d-dimensional hyper-rectangle.Finally, we
“stretch” the graph by replacing each edge with a path of length 1 ≤ ℓ = Θ(α) between
its endpoints. This causes the addition of ℓ − 1 new vertices per edge. We call these
new vertices “non-intersection vertices” to distinguish them from the already existing
“intersection vertices”. Non-intersection vertices will buy all the links of the graph and
we will show that they cannot remove edges as this would result in an increase of at
least Ω(ℓ) in their eccentricity.
We now give the details of the construction, which will depend on ℓ ≥ 1, d ≥ 2, and
δ1, . . . , δd ≥ 1, where δi is the “length” of the i-th dimension. Vertices will be named
after their coordinates and we will interpret the i-th coordinate modulo 2δi, that is
2δi ≡ 0.
The graph is built by starting from an empty graph, proceeding in the following way:
add the set of intersection vertices, each of these vertices is a d-tuple (ℓ·a1, ℓ·a2, . . . , ℓ·ad)
such that a1 ≡ a2 ≡ · · · ≡ ad (mod 2)where each ai with 1 ≤ i ≤ d is an integer between
0 and 2δi − 1. Then, connect each intersection vertex (x1, . . . , xd) to 2d other vertices,
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Fig. 1. Graph with d = 2 dimensions of sizes δ1 = 15 and δ2 = 5, and ℓ = 2. Intersection vertices have
a bigger size than non-intersection vertices. In this example the view of the intersection vertex (k∗, k∗) for
k = 4 is in red. Notice that the vertex (k∗, k∗) lies on an invisible portion of the torus.
using a path of length ℓ (so if ℓ = 1 we only need to add edges). More precisely, we
connect such a vertex to (x1±ℓ, x2±ℓ, . . . , xd±ℓ) for every possible choice of the ± signs.
We label the ℓ− 1 non-intersection vertices on the paths by varying the coordinates of
the endpoints according to the choice of ± signs, that is we traverse the path from one
endpoint to another and label each non-intersection vertex by adding or subtracting 1
from the coordinates of the previous vertex. In the following, for convenience, when we
choose a vertex, we will assume that the i-th coordinate is between 0 and 2δi − 1.
We will consider graphs where δ1 = · · · = δd−1 =
⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1 and δd ≥
⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1. Let
k∗ = ℓ(δ1 − 1), u be the vertex (k∗, . . . , k∗), and u′ be the vertex (k∗ + ℓ, . . . , k∗ + ℓ).
Two examples of this construction, with different parameters, are shown in Figure 1
and in Figure 2.
The following result is not hard to prove:
LEMMA 3.3. Let x = (x1, . . . , xd) and y = (y1, . . . , yd) be two vertices. We have
d(x, y) ≥ max1≤i≤dmin{|xi − yi|, 2δiℓ − |xi − yi|}. If at least one of x and y is an in-
tersection vertex, then the previous inequality is strict.
COROLLARY 3.4. The diameter of the graph is at least ℓ · δd.
PROOF. By Lemma 3.3 the distance between the vertex (0, . . . , 0) and any vertex
whose last coordinate is ℓδd is at least ℓδd.
We also consider an “open” version of the previous graph, that is built in a similar
way except that we do not treat the coordinates in a modular fashion, so ai is now
between 1 and δi, and we connect intersection vertices (with paths) only when all their
coordinates differ by exactly ℓ. It is not hard to see that the view of each player is
isomorphic to a subgraph of this “open” graph, and that Lemma 3.3 becomes:
LEMMA 3.5. Let x = (x1, . . . , xd) and y = (y1, . . . , yd)
be two vertices in the “open” graph. We have d(x, y) ≥
max1≤i≤d |xi − yi|, If at least one of x and y is an intersection vertex, then the
previous inequality is strict.
We now prove a general lemma that will be very useful in the following proofs:
LEMMA 3.6. Let H be a graph, u ∈ V (H), and L = {v1, . . . ,
v|L|} ⊆ V (H) \ {u}. If dH(u, vi) ≥ h for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|, dH(vi, vj) ≥ 2h − 2 for
every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |L| with i 6= j, and F is a set of edges such that: (i) each edge in F has u
as an endpoint, and (ii) dH+F (u, vi) < h for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|, then it holds |F | ≥ |L|.
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1
2 = ℓ
3
4 = 2ℓ
5ℓ
2δ1ℓ ≡ 0
δ1ℓ = 3ℓ
.
.
.
0 1 2 = ℓ 3 4 = 2ℓ . . . δ2ℓ = 4ℓ 2δ2ℓ ≡ 0. . .
(k∗, k∗) u
u′
Fig. 2. Graph with d = 2 dimensions of sizes δ1 = 3 and δ2 = 4, and ℓ = 2. Intersection vertices have
a bigger size than non-intersection vertices. The vertices on the first row (resp. column) coincide with the
corresponding vertices on last row (resp. column). In this example the view of the intersection vertex (k∗, k∗)
for k = 4 is highlighted in gray.
PROOF. Every shortest path from u to a vertex v ∈ L in H +F must use exactly one
edge (u, y) ∈ F , and dH(v, y) ≤ h− 2 must hold.
For every other vertex v′ ∈ L \ {u}, the shortest path between u and v′ in H + F
cannot use the edge (u, y), otherwise we would have:
dH+F (u, v
′) = 1 + dH(y, v′) = 1 + dH(y, v′) + dH(y, v)
− dH(y, v) ≥ dH(v′, v)− dH(y, v) ≥ 2h− 2− (h− 2) ≥ h.
This implies that F must contain at least one edge for each vertex of L.
We now define the ownership of the edges. Consider the path 〈u =
x0, x1, . . . , xℓ−1, xℓ = u′〉 from u to u′. For i = 1, . . . , ℓ−1, vertex xi buys the edge towards
xi−1, and xℓ−1 also buys the edge towards u′. The ownership of the edges of the other
paths are defined symmetrically. Observe that the intersection vertices buy no edges.
Given an intersection vertex v = (x1, x2, . . . , xd) we define Fh(v) as the set of
vertices reachable by traversing an edge incident to v, and then proceeding in
the same direction for a total of h steps, i.e., Fh(v) = {(x1 ± h, x2 ± h, . . . , xd ±
h), for every possible choice of ± signs}. If h ≤ k then |Fh(v)| = 2d and, by Lemma
3.3, the distance between v and any of those vertices is exactly h.
The following lemmas are instrumental to prove the lower bound to the PoA
for MAXNCG as they will provide sufficient conditions for intersection and non-
intersection vertices to be in equilibrium.
LEMMA 3.7. If d ≥ log k−1α then the intersection vertices are in equilibrium.
PROOF. By symmetry, let us consider only the intersection vertex u. As u has not
bought any edge, she can modify her strategy only by buying new edges. Every vertex
in the set Fk(u) is at distance k from u, moreover, by Lemma 3.5, any two distinct
vertices in Fk(u) have a distance of at least 2k in the view of u.
By Lemma 3.6, u needs to buy at least 2d edges in order to reduce her eccentricity. If
she does so, she saves at most k− 1 on the usage cost while paying at least α2d, but we
have α2d ≥ k − 1.
LEMMA 3.8. If k ≥ ℓ, for every non-intersection vertex v, there is a set L of 2d vertices
at distance k from v and at distance at least 2k − ℓ between each other in the view of v.
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PROOF. By symmetry, let v = (k∗+ℓ−z, . . . , k∗+ℓ−z)with 1 < z ≤ ⌊ ℓ2⌋. The nearest
intersecting vertex from v is u′. Let L′ = Fk−z(u′)\{(k∗+ℓ−(k−z), . . . , k∗+ℓ−(k−z))}.
Any pair of vertices in L′ differs by at least one coordinate and, by Lemma 3.5, is at
distance at least 2k − 2z ≥ 2k − ℓ in the view of v.
Let v′ be a vertex of L′, the shortest path from v to v′ must contain either u or u′. By
Lemma 3.5, if it contains u then we have: d(v, v′) = d(v, u)+d(u, v′) ≥ ℓ− z+ ℓ+k− z =
2ℓ + k − 2z ≥ k, otherwise it contains u′, and we have: d(v, v′) = d(v, u′) + d(u′, v′) ≥
z + k − z = k. Therefore d(u′, v′) ≥ k.
Now consider the vertex y = (k∗ + ℓ − z − k, . . . , k∗ + ℓ − z − k). We have that y 6∈ L′
and, by Lemma 3.5, d(v, y) ≥ k and d(y, v′) ≥ 2k.
The claim follows as we can define L = L′ ∪ {y}.
LEMMA 3.9. If α+12 ≤ ℓ ≤ α + 2 and d ≥ log(k−1α + 2), then every non-intersection
vertex v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the strategies that increase the number of bought
edges.
PROOF. Notice that each non-intersection vertex has
bought at most 2 edges, and consider a strategy that increases the number of
bought edges.
If k ≤ ℓ − 1 then the building cost increases by at least α while the usage cost
decreases at most by k − 1, but we have α ≥ ℓ− 2 ≥ k − 1.
Otherwise, k ≥ ℓ and, by Lemma 3.8, there exists a set of at least 2d vertices at
distance at least k ≥ k − ℓ2 from v, and 2k − ℓ between each other. By Lemma 3.6, v
needs to have at least 2d incident edges in order to reduce her eccentricity by at least
ℓ
2 .
If, in the new strategy, v has less than 2d incident edges then the building cost in-
creases by at least α, and the usage cost decreases by at most ℓ2 − 1, but we have
α ≥ ℓ2 − 1.
If, in the new strategy, v has at least 2d incident edges, then the building cost in-
creases by at least α(2d − 2), and the eccentricity decreases by at most k − 1, but we
have α(2d − 2) ≥ k − 1.
LEMMA 3.10. If ℓ ≥ α, every non-intersection vertex v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the
strategies that decrease the number of bought edges.
PROOF. By symmetry, let v = (k∗ + z, . . . , k∗ + z) with 1 ≤ z < ℓ. The vertex v can
decrease the number of bought edges by at most 1, thus saving α on the building cost.
Let G′ be the view of v where the edges incident to the vertex v have been removed,
x = (k∗ + z + k, . . . , k∗ + z + k), and x′ = (k∗ + z − k, . . . , k∗ + z − k). If x and x′ are not
connected in G′, then v cannot decrease the number of bought edges.
Otherwise, let π be a shortest path between x and x′ inG′. Let y = (k∗+z+h, . . . , k∗+
z + h) be the first vertex in π such that the following vertex in π is different from
(k∗ + i, . . . , k∗ + i) for all values of i ∈ Z. Notice that y must be an intersection vertex,
and let y′ be the first intersection vertex following y in π. At least one of the coordinates
of y′ must be k∗ + z + h+ ℓ.
We have dG′(v, x) = dG′(v, x
′) = +∞ and, by Lemma 3.5:
dG′(x, x
′) ≥ dG′(x, y) + dG′(y, y′) + dG′(y′, x′)
≥ k − h+ ℓ+ k + h+ ℓ ≥ 2k + 2ℓ.
By Lemma 3.6, u needs at least 2 incident edges for her eccentricity to be under k+ℓ.
If v decreases the number of bought edges then v has at most 1 incident edge, and her
usage cost increases by at least ℓ, but we have α ≤ ℓ.
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LEMMA 3.11. If α ≤ ℓ ≤ α + 2, k ≥ ℓ, and d ≥ log(k−1α + 2), then every non-
intersection vertex v is in equilibrium.
PROOF. By Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 v is in equilibrium w.r.t. all the strategies
that either increase or decrease the number of bought edges.
We now show that v is also in equilibrium w.r.t. the strategies that do not change the
number of bought edges. As the building cost of v remains the same, v must save on
her usage cost in order to change her strategy.
We will show that v cannot decrease her usage even when she buys the new edges
in addition to the ones already bought.
If v owns only one edge then let, by symmetry, v = (k∗ + z, . . . , k∗ + z) with 1 ≤
z < ℓ, and let the bought edge be towards (k∗ + z + 1, . . . , k∗ + z + 1). The vertices
(k∗+ z+ k, . . . , k∗+ z+ k) and (k∗+ z− k, . . . , k∗+ z− k) are at distance k from v and 2k
between each other. By Lemma 3.6, v needs at least 2 new incident edges to decrease
her eccentricity under k, but she can only add one.
If v owns two edges then, by symmetry, let v = (k∗ + ℓ− 1, . . . , k∗ + ℓ− 1) so she has
an edge towards u′.
The vertices inFk−1(u′)\(k + ℓ− k + 1, . . . , k + ℓ− k + 1) are at distance k from v and
2k − 2 between each other, in the view of v. By Lemma 3.6, v needs at least 2d − 1 ≥ 3
new incident edges in order to decrease her eccentricity under k, but she can only add
two.
We are now ready to prove the following:
THEOREM 3.12. If 1 < α ≤ k ≤ 2
√
logn−3, then the PoA of MAXNCG is
Ω
(
n
α·2(log kℓ +3) log kℓ
)
.
PROOF. Fix ℓ = ⌈α⌉, and notice that k ≥ ℓ ≥ 2 holds as k must be an integer. Fix
d =
⌈
log
(
k
ℓ + 2
)⌉
, this implies d ≥ 2. We will use the following inequalities: log (kℓ ) ≤
d ≤ log (kℓ )+ 3. Finally, as already said, we set δ1, . . . , δd−1 to ⌈kℓ ⌉+ 1.
In order to be δd ≥ δ1 it suffices for k to be at most 2
√
logn−3, as shown by the following
calculations.
The number of intersection vertices of the graph is N = 2
∏d
i=1 δi = 2(
⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1)d−1δd
while the total number of vertices is: n = N+2d−1N(ℓ−1) = N(2d−1(ℓ−1)+1) therefore
N = n2d−1(ℓ−1)+1 ≥ n2d−1ℓ .
δd ≥ δ1 ⇐⇒ N
2(
⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1)d−1
≥
⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1
⇐= n
2dℓ
≥
(⌈
k
ℓ
⌉
+ 1
)d
⇐= k ≤ n
1
d
2
ℓ1−
1
d − 2ℓ
⇐= 6k ≤ n 1d ⇐⇒ d log 6k ≤ logn
⇐= (log k + 3)2 ≤ logn⇐= k ≤ 2
√
logn−3.
By Corollary 3.4, the diameter of the graph is at least:
ℓ δd = Ω
(
Nℓd
2kd−1
)
= Ω
(
nℓd−1
2dkd−1
)
= Ω
(
nℓd
kd
)
= Ω
(
n
(kℓ )
d
)
= Ω
(
n
2d log
k
ℓ
)
= Ω
(
n
2(log
k
ℓ
+3) log k
ℓ
)
.
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By Lemma 3.7 and Proposition 3.11 the graph is in equilibrium. As every vertex in
the graph owns at most 2 edges, the total number of edges is at most 2n, and the PoA
is:
Ω
(
αn+ nℓδd
αn
)
= Ω
(
ℓδd
α
)
= Ω
(
n
α · 2(log kα+3) log kα
)
.
3.2. Upper bounds for MAXNCG
Given a graph H , we denote by βH,h(v) the ball of radius h centered at node v in H ,
namely the set of vertices whose distance from v in H is at most h. When the graph
H is clear from the context we will drop the corresponding subscript. The following
lemma shows a relation between k and the number of nodes that a player sees in an
equilibrium graphG. A similar result is shown in [Demaine et al. 2012] for the original
game.
LEMMA 3.13. Let G be an equilibrium graph whose radius is greater than or equal
to k/2, and let N = |βG,k(u)| be the number of nodes that u sees in G. If α ≤ k − 1 we
have that k = O(min{ 3
√
Nα2, α 4
√
logN}).
PROOF. First, we need to prove that k = O(
√
Nα), and do so by showing that N =
Ω(k2/α). For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k/2, let Li be the vertices of βG,k(u) whose distance from u
is equal to i. We show that |Li| = Ω(i/α). If u bought the edges towards all the vertices
in Li she would decrease her eccentricity by at least k − max{k − i, i} = k − k + i = i
and increase her building cost by α|Li|. As G is an equilibrium graph, we have that
α|Li| ≥ i, i.e., |Li| ≥ i/α. Therefore,N ≥
∑⌊k/2⌋
i=1 |Li| ≥
∑⌊k/2⌋
i=1 i/α = Ω(k
2/α).
Now we prove that k = O(
3
√
Nα2) by showing that N = Ω(k3/α2). Let h = ⌊k/8⌋ − 1,
and let h¯ = k−2h = k−2⌊k/8⌋+2. By the choice of h and h¯, every path of length less than
or equal to 2h between two vertices of βG,h¯(u) is entirely contained in βG,k(u). We select
a subset of vertices in βG,h¯(u) as center points by the following greedy algorithm. First,
we unmark all vertices in βG,h¯(u). Then we repeatedly select an unmarked vertex x in
βG,h¯(u) as center point, and mark all unmarked vertices in βG,h¯(u) whose distances in
the graph induced by βG,k(u) are at most 2h from x.
Suppose that we select l vertices x1, x2, . . . , xl as center points. By construction, every
vertex in βG,k(u) has distance of at most 4h to some center point. If player u bought the
l edges towards the l vertices x1, x2, . . . , xl, she would decrease her eccentricity w.r.t.
all the vertices in βG,k(u) by at least k − (4h + 1) ≥ k − 4⌊k/8⌋+ 3 > k/2 and increase
her building cost by αl. Because G is an equilibrium graph, we have αl ≥ k/2, thus
l ≥ k/(2α). By the choice of h and h¯, the distance in G between any pair of center
points is greater than or equal to 2h + 1, furthermore βG,h(xi) ⊆ βG,k(u) for every
i = 1, . . . , l. As a consequence, the balls of radius h centered at the center points are
pairwise disjoint, and thus
N = |βG,k(u)| ≥
l∑
i=1
|βG,h(xi)| = l · Ω(k2/α) = Ω(k3/α2).
Finally we prove that k = O
(
α 4
√
logN
)
by showing that N = Ω
(
2log
2
4(k/α)
)
for every
value of α ≤ k − 1. First, we prove the following useful claim:
CLAIM 1. Let i < k/5, and let N¯ = minv∈V |βG,i(v)|. Either there exists a vertex
having eccentricity strictly less than 5i or |βG,4i+1(v)| ≥ (N¯ i)/α for every vertex v.
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PROOF. If there is a vertex having eccentricity strictly less than 5i, then the claim
is obvious. Otherwise, for every vertex v, we have that the eccentricity of v is greater
than or equal to 5i. Let S be the set of vertices whose distance from u is 3i + 1. By the
choice of i, every path of length less than or equal to 2i between a pair of vertices in
βG,3i+1(u) is entirely contained in βG,k(u). We select a subset of S, called center points,
by the following greedy algorithm. First we unmark all vertices in S. Then we select
an unmarked vertex x ∈ S as a center point, mark all unmarked vertices in S whose
distance from x is less than or equal to 2i, and assign these vertices to x.
Suppose that we select l vertices x1, x2, . . . , xl as center points. We prove that l ≥ i/α.
If player u bought the l edges towards the vertices x1, x2, . . . , xl, she would decrease her
eccentricity w.r.t. all the vertices in βG,k(u), by at least k−max{k−i, 3i+1} = k−(k−i) =
i. Because u has not bought these edges, we must have lα ≥ i.
According to the greedy algorithm, the distance between any pair of center points is
greater than or equal to 2i + 1; hence the balls of radius i centered at the vertices xj
are pairwise disjoint. Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣∣
l⋃
j=1
βG,i(xj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
l∑
j=1
|βG,i(xj)| ≥ lN¯ ≥ (N¯ i)α.
For every j = 1, . . . , l, we have d(u, xj) = 3k + 1, so βG,i(xj) ⊆ βG,4i+1(u). Therefore,
|βG,4i+1(u)| ≥ (N¯ i)/α.
Let N¯i = minv∈V |βG,i(v)|. Because G is a connected equilibrium and ⌈α⌉ ≤ k, N¯⌈α⌉ ≥
⌈α⌉. By Lemma 1, for every i < k/5, either there exists a vertex having eccentricity
strictly less than 5i or N¯4i+1 ≥ N¯i. Define the numbers a0, a1, . . . using the recurrence
relation ai = 4ai−1 + 1 with a0 = ⌊α⌋. By induction, ai ≥ α4i. If the radius of G is
strictly less than k, then let j be the least number such that the radius of G is less
than or equal to 5aj; otherwise, let j be the least number such that aj ≥ k/5. As the
radius of G is greater than or equal to k/2, we have that aj = Θ(k). By definition of
j, N¯ai+1 ≥ (aiN¯ai)/α ≥ 4iN¯ai , for every i < j. From these inequalities we derive that
N¯aj ≥ 4
∑j−1
i=0 i. But N¯aj ≤ N , so
∑j−1
i=1 i = j(j − 1)/2 ≤ log4N . This inequality implies
that j ≤ 1 +√2 log4N = 1 + √logN . Solving the recurrence relation, aj = O(α 4j) =
O(α4
√
logN ). As aj = Θ(k), k = O(α4
√
logN ).
From this, it immediately follows:
COROLLARY 3.14. If α ≤ k − 1 and k > c · min{n, 3
√
nα2,
α 4
√
logn}, for a suitable constant c, then in every equilibrium graph each player
sees the whole graph, thus the set of LKEs coincides with the set of NEs.
Now, we provide an upper bound to the diameter of an equilibrium graph.
LEMMA 3.15. Let G be an equilibrium graph of diameter d. If |βG,k(v)| ≥ γ for every
vertex v, then d ≤ 3knγ .
PROOF. Let π = (x0, . . . , xd) be a diametral path of G. We select a set of vertices
C such that the k-neighborhoods of the vertices of C are pairwise disjoint and cover
all the nodes of π. We must have |C|γ ≤ n, which implies that |C| ≤ nγ , and thus the
diameter of G is at most |C|(2k + 1) = (2k+1)nγ ≤ 3knγ .
LEMMA 3.16. If α ≤ k − 1 the diameter of an equilibrium graph G is
O
(
min{nα2k2 , kn2log24 kα }
)
.
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PROOF. Consider a generic vertex v, and let N = |βG,k(v)|. From Lemma
3.13, we have that k = O(min{ 3
√
Nα2, α4
√
logN}), which implies that N =
Ω(max{ k3α2 , 2log
2
4
k
α }). Now, using Lemma 3.15, we have that the diameter of G must
be O
(
min{nα2k2 , kn2log24 kα }
)
.
We now derive an upper bound to the density of an equilibrium graph. We argue on
the girth of the graph in a way similar to [Demaine et al. 2012].
LEMMA 3.17. The number of the edges of an equilibrium graphG is O(n1+
2
min{α,2k} ).
PROOF. Let g be the girth of G. We first show that g ≥ 2 + min{α, 2k}, and then the
claim follows from the fact that a graph with girth g′ must have at most O(n1+
2
g′−2 )
edges [Bolloba´s 2004]. Assume by contradiction that there is a cycle C of length strictly
less than 2+min{α, 2k}. Then consider a player u that owns an edge of the cycle. Since
u can see the cycle, she can remove the edge. The deletion would increase the distance
to any other node by at most |C|−2 while u would save α > |C|−2, and henceG cannot
be an equilibrium.
We can now prove the following:
THEOREM 3.18. The PoA of MAXNCG is O
(
n
2
min{α,2k} + n1+α
)
if α ≥ k − 1 and
O
(
n
2
α +min{nαk2 , nkα·2 14 log2 kα }
)
if α ≤ k − 1.
PROOF. If α ≥ k− 1 then the claim follows from Lemma 3.17 and from the fact that
the diameter of an equilibrium graph is at most n − 1. Otherwise, α ≤ k − 1 and the
claim immediately follows from Lemma 3.17 and Lemma 3.16.
3.3. Putting all together
Here we summarize our lower and upper bounds to the PoA for MAXNCG by showing
how they combine depending on the values of α and k.
First, recall that whenever the view of the players is sufficiently large, then in every
LKE, players actually have a full knowledge of the network, and so LKEs coincides
with NEs (hence the PoA is the same as in the full knowledge version of the game)
as shown in Corollary 3.14. The corresponding region is shown in gray in Figure 3.
Concerning our three lower bounds, the first one of Ω
(
n
1+α
)
holds for α ≥ k − 1, i.e.
in the regions numbered ②, ③, and ⑥ in Figure 3. For 1 < α ≤ k and k ≤ 2
√
logn−3
we provided a strong lower bound of Ω( n
α2Θ(log
2 k
α
)
) (regions ①, ④, ⑤ in Figure 3). Notice
that when k = Θ(α) this lower bound boils down to Ω(nα ), which is tight. Unfortunately,
if α > k, the previous lower bound is no longer valid, instead we provided a third lower
bound of Ω(n
1
Θ(k) ) holding for k = o(log n) (regions ①, ②, ③ in Figure 3).
Turning to the upper bounds to the PoA, in Theorem 3.18, we proved them by con-
sidering both the density and the diameter of an equilibrium graph. We showed that
the number of edges can be at most O(n1+
2
min{α,2k} ). Regarding the diameter, since for
α ≥ k − 1 it can be shown to be Ω(n), we considered the case α ≤ k − 1 where we gave
an upper bound of O(min{nα2k2 , nk2Θ(log2 kα ) )}. Notice that this upper bound is a minimum
of two terms. Intuitively, the first one is better when k is not too big w.r.t. α, e.g. when
k = O(α polylog(α)). The corresponding region lies between the dashed gray curve and
the line of equation α = k − 1 shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Lower and upper bounds to the PoA for MAXNCG. The partition in regions comes up by the combi-
nation of the various bounds that we give in Section 3. Notice that the gray region is the set of pairs (α, k)
such that, in every LKE, players actually have a full knowledge of the network, and so LKEs coincides with
NEs.
The bounds to the PoA that arise from the various combinations of these results are
summarized in Figure 3. Notice that the bounds for the regions under the line k = α+1
are essentially tight.
4. RESULTS FOR SUMNCG
In this section we provide our results for SUMNCG. Recall that in the full-knowledge
version of the game the spanning star is the social optimum and has a cost of Θ(αn +
n2). We start with a quite strong lower bound to the PoA.
Consider a graph similar to the one shown in Figure 2, whose construction has been
described in Section 3.1. In particular, we build such a graph using the following pa-
rameters: d = 2, ℓ = 2, δ1 =
⌈
k
2
⌉
+ 1 and δ2 ≥ δ1 which will be specified later. We know
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that N = 2δ1δ2 and that n = 6δ1δ2. We want δ2 ≥ δ1 ⇐⇒ n6δ1 ≥ δ1 ⇐⇒ δ1 ≤
√
n
6 ⇐=
k ≤
√
2n
3 − 4. We have the following:
LEMMA 4.1. For α ≥ 4k3, the previous graph is an equilibrium.
PROOF. First notice that each vertex v sees at most 4k2 other vertices. As α ≥ 4k3
and v can reduce the distance to each vertex by at most (k − 1), v cannot increase the
number of bought edges.
Suppose that the player v changes her strategy from σv to σ
′
v, let L be the set of ver-
tices that are at distance k from v. Consider the view of v before the strategy changes,
where the edges of σv have been removed and replaced with the edges of σ
′
v. Each ver-
tex of L must be at distance at most k from v in this new graph. Otherwise, suppose
the existence of a vertex x ∈ L that is at distance at least k + 1 in this new graph.
When v computes ∆(σv , σ
′
v) it will also consider the case where a certain number of
(new) vertices η are adjacent to x, therefore her usage will be at least kη which, for a
suitable value of η, is greater than the cost of v in σ.
Let v = (k∗ + 1, k∗ + 1), and consider the set of vertices L =
(Fk−1(u) ∪ Fk−1(u′)) \
{(k∗ + 3− k, k∗ + 3− k), (k∗ + k − 1, k∗ + k − 1)}.
It is easy to see that all the vertices in L are at distance k from v, and that every
vertex x in the view of v, that is not a neighbor of v, has at most 2 vertices of L that
are at distance at most k − 1. Finally, every vertex x in the view of v has at least one
vertex of L at a distance at least k.
This suffices to conclude that every vertex v is currently playing a best response and,
therefore, the graph is in equilibrium.
Using the above lemma we can prove the following:
THEOREM 4.2. Let α ≥ 4k3. For any k ≤
√
2n
3 − 4, the PoA of SUMNCG is Ω(n/k) if
α ≤ n, and Ω(1 + n2kα ) otherwise.
PROOF. By the above lemma, the graph is in equilibrium and has diameter Ω(δ2) =
Ω(nk ). Moreover, it is easy to see that each vertex has Ω(n) vertices at distance Ω(
n
k ).
Since the graph has Θ(n) edges, we have that the cost of the graph is Ω(αn + n2/k)
while the social optimum is a star with cost O(αn + n2). The claim follows.
The following theorem provides a lower bound for a different range of values of the
parameters α and k.
THEOREM 4.3. If α ≥ kn and k ≥ 2, the PoA of SUMNCG is Ω(n 12k−2 ).
PROOF. We use the same construction of Lemma 3.2. Remind that the view of each
vertex v is a tree of height k with q(q − 1)i−1 vertices on level i. Therefore v has to buy
at least q edges. Moreover, if she buys exactly q edges, then she cannot improve her
cost as her neighbors are the medians of the corresponding subtrees.
As α ≥ kn, v cannot improve her cost by increasing the number of bought edges. The
claim follows.
Finally, we have:
THEOREM 4.4. If k > 1 + 2
√
α, then in every equilibrium graph each player sees the
whole graph, thus the set of LKEs coincides with the set of NEs.
PROOF. Let G be an equilibrium with diameter at least k (otherwise the claim is
trivially true), and let u and v be two vertices such that dG(u, v) = k. By buying the
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Fig. 4. Lower bounds to the PoA for SUMNCG. The behavior of the PoA in the region between the two
curves is open. Notice that the gray region is the set of pairs (α, k) such that, in every LKE, players actually
have a full knowledge of the network, and so LKEs coincide with NEs.
edge (u, v), the player u could decrease the cost needed to reach the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
vertices
along the shortest path between u and v by at least k
2
4 − 24 . As G is an equilibrium we
must have k
2
4 − 24 ≤ α, which implies k ≤ 2
√
α+ 1.
The previous results are summarized in Figure 4. Notice that it remains open to es-
tablish a lower bound to the PoA for values of k between Θ( 3
√
α) and Θ(
√
α). Moreover,
we plan in the future to study the corresponding upper bounds.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present an experimental study whose aim is to complement our
theoretical analysis by providing insights on several features of the game. Indeed,
our asymptotic bounds depends on heterogeneous parameters, and so an empirical
evidence of their tightness is required. In particular, our study concerns the behavior
of best-response dynamics in MAXNCG, by focusing on the convergence time (i.e., the
number of steps needed to form a stable network) and on the structural properties
of the resulting equilibria. This way, on one hand our goal is to check whether the
theoretical existence of better- and best-responce cycles is actually frequent, and on
the other hand we essentially aim to verify whether stable networks have a social cost
which follows the trend suggested by the analysis of the PoA we have provided. As
we will show, the answer to the first question is in the negative, while as far as the
second aspect is concerned, we will provide an evidence that our analysis is actually
quite accurate (at least when α is not too small).
5.1. Experiments
In our experiments, we simulated the best-response dynamics of the players for the
MAXNCG model. The initial configuration consists of a network randomly sampled
from a certain class of graphs, as we will describe in the following. The players play in
turns, following a round-robin policy, i.e., in each round we consider all the players, one
at time. When a player is considered, we compute a best-response strategy according to
her local knowledge of the network, and whenever this strategy is strictly better than
the current one we update the network. Then, we move to the next player. We continue
this process until we attain an equilibrium, i.e., we find a round where no player is
able to improve her cost. Moreover, since the convergence is not guaranteed, whenever
the execution time exceeds a given threshold, we check if the last strategy profile of
the current round already appeared as the last strategy profile of any previous round.
In this case, since of the round-robin policy, we can conclude that the best-response
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Table I. Statistics for the random trees used in the experimental
evaluation. In each row, 20 random trees with the same number n
of nodes are considered. The value of n is reported in the first col-
umn. The remaining columns contain the average statistics over
the corresponding trees along with their 95% confidence intervals.
n Diameter Max. degree Max. Bought Edges
20 10.65± 0.76 4.00± 0.26 2.75± 0.34
30 13.90± 1.18 4.30± 0.31 3.15± 0.31
50 19.55± 1.48 4.60± 0.35 3.30± 0.31
70 22.10± 1.57 5.05± 0.39 3.50± 0.32
100 25.15± 1.95 5.35± 0.35 3.45± 0.28
200 43.20± 3.95 5.30± 0.31 3.85± 0.31
dynamics admits a cycle, hence we stop the simulation as we know that no equilibrium
will ever be reached by the players.
For each starting network, the above experiment is repeated with
different values of the parameters α and k taken from the set
{0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.7, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10} and from the set
{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 1000}, respectively. The case k = 1000 corresponds
to the classical version of the game where every player has no restriction on her view.
In order to compensate for the variability in measurements, for each pair of the
parameters α and k we ran 20 distinct experiments starting from different ran-
dom graphs belonging to the same class. Overall, we simulated about 36 000 dif-
ferent dynamics and, after each round, we collected several different features of
the current network such as: diameter, social cost, maximum/average degree, mini-
mum/maximum/average number of bought edges, minimum/maximum/average num-
ber of vertices in the view of the players, along with others. Moreover, for each run we
also collected global statistics as the number of rounds needed to reach an equilibrium
(if any), and the total number of strategy changes performed by the players.
In Figures 5-10, we will show how the mean values of those features (taken over the
20 different starting networks) vary as a function of either α, k or n. We also report the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals, as long as they do not affect readability.
5.2. Input classes of graphs
We considered the following classes of graphs:
—Random trees: for a given number n of vertices, we picked a tree uniformly at random
from the set of all possible trees on n vertices. We determined the ownership of each
edge (u, v) of the tree by choosing between u and v with a fair coin toss. The above
was repeated for all the values of n in {20, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200}. In Table I, we report
some statistics of the generated trees for the different values of n.
—Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs: we generated random graphs according to the classical
G(n, p)model [Erdo˝s and Re´nyi 1959] in which a graph of n vertices is built by adding
independently each (undirected) edge with a probability of p. The parameters n and
p were chosen so that the resulting graph was likely to be connected. Any remain-
ing unconnected graph was discarded and regenerated from scratch. We generated
graphs with both 100 and 200 vertices and, for each n, we set the values of p in order
to produce three graphs with different densities. As for trees, the owner of each edge
was chosen uniformly at random between its endpoints. A summary of the resulting
graphs can be found in Table II.
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Table II. Statistics for the different Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs used in the experimental eval-
uation. In each row, a different set of the parameters n and p is considered (first two columns).
For each of them, 20 different graphs have been randomly sampled. The remaining columns
report the average statistics over these graphs along with their 95% confidence intervals.
n p Edges Diameter Max. degree Max. Bought Edges
100 0.060 301.10± 7.51 5.30± 0.22 12.50 ± 0.67 7.90± 0.43
100 0.100 494.40 ± 10.86 4.00± 0.00 18.45 ± 0.82 11.40 ± 0.69
100 0.200 984.35 ± 12.23 3.00± 0.00 29.90 ± 1.26 18.25 ± 0.57
200 0.035 698.25 ± 11.22 5.25± 0.21 15.35 ± 0.61 9.20± 0.42
200 0.050 992.45 ± 10.18 4.20± 0.19 19.30 ± 0.55 12.50 ± 0.65
200 0.100 2005.55 ± 12.87 3.00± 0.00 32.80 ± 1.11 18.95 ± 0.54
5.3. Computing a best-response strategy
As we pointed out in the theoretical part, the problem of computing a best response
for a player is NP-hard. In order to deal with nontrivial values of n, we reduced the
problem of computing a best response to the problem of computing (a variant of) the
minimum dominating set of a suitable graph, and then we used the Gurobi solver
[Gurobi Optimization 2014] on classical integer linear programming formulation of
minimum dominating set. We now sketch the idea behind our approach.
Let u be the player for which we want to compute a best-response strategy. First of
all, from Proposition 2.1 we can just compute the best move of u with respect to her
view H . Now, we remove u from the graph H , and we guess the eccentricity h of u in
the graph resulting from a best-response move. If H ′ denotes the (h − 1)-th power4 of
the graph H \ {u}, then it is easy to see that the original problem is equivalent to that
of finding a minimum dominating set ofH ′ in which certain vertices are constrained to
be included in the solution, namely those who bought an edge towards u in the current
strategy profile.
5.4. Experimental results
Here we discuss some interesting features of the experimental results concerning
MAXNCG.
Knowledge of the network. We start by arguing on how the size of the network known
by players at equilibrium varies as a function of k. This is both interesting by itself, and
it will also be instrumental for further discussions regarding the quality of equilibria.
Let us consider Figure 5, where both the mean and the minimum number of vertices
in the players’ view is reported. The actual value of each point is the average over
the different equilibria obtained from 20 trees with 100 vertices each (using the same
set of parameters). The same measurements on the other classes of graphs exhibit
essentially the same behavior and are not reported.
Clearly, the view of a player decreases as α increases, and rapidly grows as k becomes
larger. Intuitively, the former is due to the fact that whenever α is small, players are
more prone to buy a large number of edges. Regarding the latter, we observe that for
the interesting threshold value of k = 7, we have that, on average, a player knows
more than 99 vertices. Moreover, the minimum size is also pretty high, since even the
player who knows the least portion of the network is able to see more than 93 vertices
(on average).
Quality of equilibria. We now discuss how our theoretical bounds on the PoA com-
pare to the experimental evaluation of the quality of equilibria, i.e., the ratio between
the social cost of the attained equilibrium and the social optimum.
4The h-th power of an undirected graphG is a graph on the same vertex-set ofG where the edge (u, v) exists
iff the distance between u and v in G is at most h.
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Fig. 5. Minimum and average number of vertices in the players’ view on stable networks as a function of α
for the various values of k. Points correspond to mean values over 20 different trees with 100 vertices, while
error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. For the sake of readability, lines that coincide with the one
for k = 1000 are not depicted.
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Fig. 6. Quality of the stable networks as a function of n for various values of k on random trees. The left
picture refers to α = 1 while the right one refers to α = 10. Points correspond to mean values over 20
different trees, while error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. For the sake of readability, lines that
essentially coincide with the one for k = 1000 are not depicted. Notice that for small values of k the quality
degrades linearly while for larger values of k the PoA is almost constant.
First of all, notice that our bounds show that the PoA decreases as α and/or k in-
crease. Moreover, for fixed values of the parameters, the PoA is Θ(n) whenever α ≥ 2.
This trend can be easily recognized in Figure 6 (b), where the quality of the equilib-
ria on experimented trees is plotted against the number of vertices for α = 10. Notice
that as soon as k exceeds 6, the quality of equilibria drastically improves. This is not
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Fig. 7. Quality of the stable networks as a function of k for various values of n, and α = 2. The bold red line
represents the trend of our theoretical upper bound. The left picture refers to random trees while the right
one refers to random graphs with n = 100 and p = 0.2. Points correspond to mean values over 20 different
graphs, while error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
surprising since, as already discussed, the players have a (almost) full-knowledge of
the stable networks, and hence the (almost) constant bounds to the PoA given for the
classical version of MAXNCG hold.
Let us now focus on smaller values of α, for example α = 1 as shown in Figure 6
(a). The general trend of the quality of equilibria is similar, except for the fact that
k ≥ 5 is now sufficient to yield full-knowledge equilibria. By contrast, our theoretical
upper bound for smaller values of k of O
(
n
2
α +min{nαk2 , nkα2Θ(log2 kα ) }
)
is nowO(n
2
α +n) =
O(n2). This comes from the first term of the sum, which is related to the density of the
equilibria. In our experiments, however, the resulting stable networks happened to be
sparse, so that the usage cost prevails instead. This suggests that our density bounds
might be too coarse, and this is somewhat supported by the corresponding lower bound
of Ω
(
max{ n
α2Θ(log
2 k
α
)
, n
1
2k−2 }
)
, which now simplifies to Ω(n)whenever the density term
is dominated by the usage cost term.
We now examine in more detail how the quality of equilibria decreases as a
function of k. Notice that, our theoretical upper bound to the PoA of O
(
n
2
α +
min{nαk2 , nkα2Θ(log2 kα ) }
)
, reduces to f(k) = O( k
2log2 k
), once α ≥ 2 and n are fixed to be
constant. In Figure 7 we report the measured quality of equilibria as a function of k
on both random trees (left) and graphs (right), for different values of n, and α = 2.
Moreover, the trend of f(k) is shown in red as a benchmark. For different values of α
the trend is very similar, but the actual quality of equilibria scales down as expected.
Fairness of equilibria. We also collected statistics about the maximum degree of sta-
ble networks and the maximum number of edges bought by the players (see Figure 8,
concerned with random graphs of 100 nodes and with p = 0.1). It is worth to notice that
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Fig. 8. Maximum degree (left) and maximum number of bought edges (right) as a function of α for various
values of k. Points correspond to mean values over 20 different random graphs with 100 vertices and p = 0.1.
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Fig. 9. Unfairness ratio, i.e., the ratio between the highest and the lowest of players’ costs, as a function of α
for various values of k. Points correspond to mean values over 20 different random graphs with 100 vertices
and p = 0.1. For the sake of readability, lines that coincide with the one for k = 1000 are not depicted. Notice
small values of k yield more fair equilibria.
for k ≥ 4 and small values of α, we have that the maximum degree is more than 80,
while a player does not buy more than 9 edges (for every values of α and k). This has a
nice consequence in terms of fairness of stable networks, as shown in Figure 9, which
decreases as k increases. This would suggest that restricting the view of the players
could help to converge towards stable networks where players’ costs do not differ too
much.
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Fig. 10. Number of rounds needed to converge to a stable network as a function of α with n = 100 (left)
and as a function of n with α = 2 (right) for various values of k. Points correspond to mean values over 20
different random trees.
Convergence time. To conclude this section let us focus on the convergence time, i.e.,
the number of rounds needed to actually reach an equilibrium (if any). As we pointed
out in the technical part, the convergence of a best-response dynamics is not guar-
anteed. In practice, however, it seems very common: we simulated about 36 000 best-
response dynamics, and only encountered best-response cycles in 5 of them. In all the
other cases convergence appeared to be pretty fast, as shown in Figure 10 for random
trees. In fact, starting from both random trees and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, for almost ev-
ery combination of α and k, in more than 95% of the times, at most 7 rounds are enough
to converge to a stable network. Finally, the total number of rounds increases with n
as one would expect, although this happens quite slowly for almost every choice of the
parameters.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied the game-theoretic and computational implications of
a limited players’ view (more precisely, confined to a prescribed distance radius from
each player) in the autonomous formation of a (large) network. In this scenario, we
developed a systematic analysis on the PoA of the two classic variants of the game,
namely MAXNCG and SUMNCG, along with an extensive experimental study, which,
for the computational feasibility reasons that have been explained in the paper, were
limited to the former game, though.
Concerning our future research, on one hand we plan to investigate some of the
issues that we left (partially) open, in particular the PoA space for the SUMNCG needs
to be explored in more detail. On the other hand, we believe that our incomplete-
knowledge approach deserves to be extended in several directions. As a first step in this
regard, in [Bilo` et al. 2014] we have considered three local-knowledge models usually
adopted in NETWORK DISCOVERY, i.e., the optimization problem of reconstructing the
topology of an unknown network through a minimum number of queries at its nodes.
For these models, we provided exhaustive answers to the canonical algorithmic game
theoretic questions w.r.t. our LKE concept. Besides studying new models, however,
we feel that our own model has still few intriguing issues that should be investigated.
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Above all, it would be interesting to relax our worst-case approach, and analyze a NCG
under a Bayesian perspective. Finally, we feel that the local-knowledge model could be
extended to other (network) game-theoretic settings, given that the global knowledge
is a recurring, still critical, assumption.
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